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ARTICLE 
Reflections on Search and Seizure and Illegally 
Seized Evidence in Canada and the United States 
by Professor Lewis R. Katz* ** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF Canadian and American development 
in the field of fundamental individual rights are a fertile area for re-
search. In many respects the two countries closely parallel each other. 
Their respective economies and defense systems are interdependent and 
their life styles are overwhelmingly similar. Moreover, opinion in Canada 
is shaped and molded by exposure to a mass media saturated with Ameri-
can news and entertainment. 
The legal systems of both Canada and the United States share a sim-
ilar heritage. Both are recent branches of British common law. The in-
quiry of this article is prompted by the fact that in at least one area of 
fundamental individual rights, the right of a citizen to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, each nation has developed radically dif-
ferent remedial measures. 
To illustrate the two approaches consider the following hypothetical 
situation: 
An ill-kempt man with long hair exits a tavern. A police officer outside 
notices him. The police officer is suspicious that the patrons of the tav-
ern are involved in drug trafficking, but has no evidence on this particu-
lar man. Solely on the basis of the fellow's appearance, the officer stops 
him and conducts a full search. He finds a quantity of marijuana in the 
man's pocket. He places the young man under arrest and charges him 
with illegal possession of a controlled substance. 
Under many systems of jurisprudence the police officer's conduct would 
not be questioned. Nonetheless, under the laws of search and seizure in 
both Canada and the United States the police officer acted illegally.1 He 
did not have reasonable cause to arrest the young man. Absent reasonable 
cause the attendant search was not incident to a valid anest and there-
fore was illegal since there were no independent grounds to justify a w~­
rantless search. 
The above case illustrates that the governing principles concerning 
• Lewis R. Katz is the John C. Hutchins Professor of Law and a Director of the Center 
for Criminal Justice at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. B.A. (1959) Queens 
College; J.D. (1963) Indiana University. 
• • The author is grateful for the able research assistance provided by Dwight Williams, 
J.D. '78, and Jay Shapiro, '80. The author is also grateful to the Canada-United States Law 
Institute for its support during the research for this article. 
1 Rex v. Brezack, 96 C.C.C. 97 (Ont. C.A., 1949); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443 (1971). 
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arrest, search and seizure are similar. The similarity ends there. In the 
United States, counsel for the accused would file a motion to suppress the 
evidence because the search was illegal. The court would grant the mo-
tion,2 and without other evidence on which to proceed the prosecution 
would be forced to dismiss the criminal charges. In Canada, the manner 
in which evidence for trial is secured is largely irrelevant. The illegally 
seized narcotics would be admitted as part of the Crown's case and the 
accused could be convicted based upon it. 3 
There is more at stake here than the adoption of different eviden-
tiary rules dictating opposite results. The choice or rejection of a specific 
remedy, the exclusionary rule, indicates that fundamental differences ex-
ist despite the apparent similarities in the two countries' legal philoso-
phies. The different responses to the conflict between police conduct and 
a citizen's right to privacy are the result of two hundred years of history 
and experience. 
The development of and continued adherence to the exclusionary 
rule in the United States is reflective of the country's origins, and its lin-
gering suspicion about government and the use or abuse of government 
authority.4 The United States is, after all, the product of an aristocratic 
and middle class revolution which, even though free of the excesses of 
twentieth century revolutions, spawned a singular mistrust of authority. 
That mistrust has not abated over the past two centuries even though the 
United States has cast off almost all other aspects of its revolutionary 
origins. Public cynicism and distrust of authority have been sustained 
and fostered by increased government interference in almost every aspect 
of life as American society has evolved into a welfare state. The recent 
excesses of Watergate and other instances of official corruption have rein-
forced that public sentiment. 
Distrust and hostility were early institutionalized in the U.S. consti-
tutional system of checks and balances. Each branch of government was 
given power to exercise restraint upon the excesses of the other. 5 There 
ensued the development of a strong judiciary, with the Supreme Court 
emerging as a co-equal of the powerful executive and legislative branches 
of government, relying upon an entrenched Constitution as its source of 
power to review acts of Congress and the presidency while protecting fun-
damental rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.6 
Canada, in contrast, was not born of violence and does not share the 
United States' heritage of suspicion of authority. Canada's rise to inde-
pendence and nationhood did not meet with opposition from the En-
2 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
• The Queen and Wray, 11 D.L.R. 3d 673 (1970): 
' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
' See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
• C. HuGHES, THE SuPREME CouRT oF THE UNITED STATES: ITs FouNDATION, METHODS, 
AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1928); T. LYONS, THE SUPREME CouRT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CoN-
TEMPORARY SOCIETY (1975). 
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glish.7 Indeed, Canada's nationhood is the result of an act of the British 
Parliament. That legislation, the British North America Act (BNA Act),8 
instituted Canadian independence and operates as the Canadian Consti-
tution, still theoretically subject to an amendment process requiring the 
approval of the British Parliament.9 
The Canadian Constitution reflects the basic differences between the 
United States and Canada. It is a statement of the powers that provincial 
governments ceded to the newly created federal government. It did not 
contain at the outset and has not since been amended to include a state-
ment of individual rights comparable to the first ten amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution. Thus, the BNA Act does not explicitly ensure individ-
ual rights. There is a Canadian Bill of Rights but it was enacted in this 
century by the Canadian Parliament. 10 It contains most of the rights enu-
merated in its American counterpart. Nonetheless, the Canadian Bill of 
Rights has not achieved the status of entrenched legislation and thus, un-
like the American Bill of Rights, is not a significant limitation upon gov-
ernmental authority.11 This form of government reflects the absence of 
distrust that accompanied the creation of the Dominion. The Canadian 
system embodies the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy that 
has no provision for checks and balances. 
Historical differences in the formation of the two nations continue to 
play a role, producing diverse reactions to the treatment of basic funda-
mental rights. Consequently, laws concerning the evidentiary ramifica-
tions of illegal arrests, searches and seizures are drastically different in 
Canada and the United States. The linchpin of the American approach is 
the exclusionary rule. The rule had its seeds in the nineteenth century 
and was judicially formalized in the United States in the twentieth cen-
tury.12 The Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to criminal pros-
ecutions in federal courts in 1914.18 The rule was made binding upon 
prosecutions in state criminal courts in 1961.14 The Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution guarantees the privacy of individual 
citizens against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures.15 The exclu-
sionary rule operates to bar the prosecution from profiting from unrea-
sonable and, hence, illegal intrusions by denying to state or federal gov-
ernments the use of evidence so secured in a criminal prosecution against 
the person whose privacy was illegally invaded. 16 
7 D. CREIGHTON, THE RoAD TO CoNFEDERATION (1964). 
8 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3 (1867). 
• See, D. CREIGHTON, CANADA'S FIRST CENTURY (1970) at 339 for a discussion of the 
amendment process. 
1° CAN. REV. STAT. c.44 (App. III) 1970, Amended 1970-71-72, STAT. OF CAN. c.38 §29. 
11 W. TARNOPOLSKY, THE CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS (1966). 
12 State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (1903). 
13 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
14 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
•• U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
18 While this definitional explanation of the rule is sufficient for purposes of our consid-
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Canada, however, has never adopted a general exclusionary rule. 
While affirming the sanctity of individual privacy and limitations of offi-
cial intrusions into that privacy, Canadian law takes the position that evi-
dence relevant to the issue of guilt or innocence must be admissible at 
triai even if secured as a result of an illegal arrest, search or seizure.17 
Presumably no matter how atrocious the official abuse, a trial judge has 
no option but to admit the evidence. Before the exclusionary rule was 
extended in the United States to the fifty states, the United States Su-
preme Court adopted as a way-station, the notion that police conduct 
which "shocked the conscience of the Court" and violated standards of 
basic decency obliged the trial court to exclude evidence so secured.18 Ca-
nadian trial judges are given no such mandate and, in fact, are not given 
any discretion in this area. If the evidence is relevant, it must be admit-
ted.19 The victim of illegal police behavior is left to other remedies.20 
The exclusionary rule as a means of protecting individual privacy is a 
peculiarly unique American institution. While traces of it may be found 
in other legal systems, the total commitment to excluding evidence se-
cured by police officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment's stricture 
against unreasonable searches and seizures is unknown elsewhere.21 The 
exclusionary rule elevates the policy of protecting individual privacy to a 
supreme position, and relegates the truth-determining function of a crim-
inal trial to secondary importance. 22 
Questions concerning the sweep of the Fourth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule continue to be raised in this country. 23 The most common issue is 
eration here, it should be noted that the scope of the Fourth Amendment guarantee has 
been significantly narrowed and the breadth of the application of the remedy so sharply 
curtailed by the present United States Supreme Court that the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment is hardly as great or restrictive of governmental action as it appeared to be in 
the 1960's. The recent personnel changes on the Court have resulted in a decline of the 
·protections that had been brought forth and nurtured by the Warren Court. In California v. 
Minjares, 100 S.Ct. 9 (1979), Justice Rehnquist joined Chief Justice Burger's campaign 
against the exclusionary rule. Justice Rehnquist's stance has been viewed as being the natu-
ral consequence of such cases as Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) and U.S. v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338 (1974). For opinions of other Justices advocating limitations of the exclusion-
ary rule, see, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 606 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (White, J., dissenting). 
17 The Queen v. Wray, l1 D.L.R. 3d 673 (1970). 
18 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
10 The Queen v. Wray, 11 D.L.R. 3d 673 (1970); Hogan v. The Queen, 48 D.L.R. 3d 427 
(1974). 
20 Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Approaches: The Canadian Tort 
Remedy and The U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. PoLICE Sci. AND AD. 36 (1973). 
21 Heydon, Illegally Obtained Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 603. For a general discus-
sion of practices in British countries, see Heydon, Illegally Obtained Evidence, 1973 CRJM. 
L. REV. 603. 
22 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
23 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979). 
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whether the suppression of evidence discourages police misconduct.24 
Other concerns go to the cost to the entire community when convictions 
are lost because the police officer erred and relevant evidence is sup-
pressed.25 Some wonder whether a society beset by by a high rate of crime 
can bear that cost and whether there are not alternative means of pro-
tecting privacy that offer as much protection at less cost.28 The debate 
concerning the rule is not confined to the classroom. The Chief Justice of 
the United States Supreme Court, Warren E. Burger, is this nation's most 
prominent critic of the exclusionary rule. He advocates the abandonment 
of the rule although a suitable alternative remedy does not exist.27 
The Canadian experience on the subject of search and seizure may 
very well be the best place for United States lawyers to look for a..r1 alter-
native to the exclusionary rule. Justice Felix Frankfurter used to look 
upon the states as (then) forty-eight laboratories developing their own 
approaches to criminal justice and the protection of fundamental individ-
ual rights.28 Now that the exclusionary rule is a constitutional doctrine 
uniformly applicable throughout the United States there can be no exper-
imenting below this mandated level of due process. 29 Absent our own 
ability to practice alternatives to the exclusionary rule, we might logically 
look to Canada to examine that country's experience in protecting the 
right of privacy and dealing with unreasonable government intrusions. 
Likewise, the American experience may be helpful to the Canadians in 
determining solutions to common issues. 
The growing disenchantment with and outright assaults upon the 
wisdom of the exclusionary rule in the United States prompted this 
study.30 The number and stature of those who advocate abandonment of 
the rule clearly indicates that even if the rule survives the 1980's it will be 
subject to constant reconsideration and reshaping. As an academician and 
former practitioner who has known no system but one which subscribes 
to the exclusionary rule, I admit to a bias in favor of its retention. The 
24 Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That It Is A Deter-
rent To Police, 62 JuDICATURE 404 (1979). 
25 People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). 
25 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
27 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, J., concurring). 
" Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
20 However the states are free under the provisions of their own constitutions to impose 
stricter standards of due process than those imposed by the United States Supreme Court 
under the federal Constitution. As the Burger Court has narrowed some of the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment, a handful of state supreme courts have construed their own 
constitutions to provide greater protection. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 
531 P. 2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975), where the California Supreme Court rejected the 
rulings in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 
(1973), authorizing full searches of persons arrested even for traffic offenses. See also, 
Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger 
Court, 62 Kv. L.J. 421 (1974). 
30 See note 16 supra. 
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Canadian approach intrigued me initially because, frankly, I _questioned 
the quality of freedom that could exist in a society which considers imma-
terial the manner by which the prosecution comes into possession of the 
evidence it intends to use to obtain a verdict of guilty against one of its 
citizens. In effect, Canadian law ignores official illegality in the course of 
punishing a citizen for violating its laws. 
Some Canadian researchers who have considered this issue have done 
so in the context of the models developed by Professor Herb Packer,31 
characterizing Canada as operating within the "crime control" model and 
the United States as operating within the "due process" model.32 They 
conclude that Canada has traditionally deemphasized individual rights in 
favor of order, and that individual rights, rather than being entrenched, 
are subject to the discretion of the authorities.33 Without at all focusing 
on these fundamental societal differences, Chief Justice Burger has re-
ferred to the Canadian approach to search and seizure with approval 
when advocating American abandonment of the exclusionary rule. 34 
There is an interest in Canada with how this subject is treated in the 
United States and there is some sentiment in Canada for adoption of a 
partial exclusionary rule. 3~ Still the Canadian discourse is not nearly as 
strong or widespread as American advocacy of the rejection of the exclu-
sionary rule. 
I have set forth to compare the two approaches to the use of evidence 
secured through illegal arrests, searches and seizures, and the effects of 
those disparate approaches upon the quality of freedom in the two coun-
tries. Preliminarily, it is necessary to set forth briefly and generally the 
development and state of the law on this subject in the two countries. 
The discussion then turns to the quality of the protection of privacy in 
Canada and the United States. Finally, I consider the wisdom of applying 
the Canadian approach in the United States. The research for this article 
is not empirical and the conclusions drawn are highly subjective. These 
observations and conclusions are designed to fuel the debate that is ongo-
31 Packer, The Courts, The Police and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 238 
(1966). 
32 P.G. Erickson, The Marijuana Arrest: The Police Role in Canadian and American 
Perspectives (an unpublished manuscript of the Addiction Research Foundation), Toronto, 
Canada. 1979. 
ss Hagan & Leon, Philosophy and Sociology of Crime Control: Canadian-American 
Comparisons, in SociAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL PROCESS (H.M. Johnson ed. 1978); See text of 
Professor Douglas Schmieser's talk this issue. 
" Bivens v. Six: Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, (1971) (Burger, C.J. 
dissenting). 
30 Can. B. Assn. Res. No.2, adopted Aug. 1978; LAw REFORM CoMMISSION oF CANADA, 
THE ExcLUSIONS OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1974); Gibson, Illegally Obtained Evi-
dence, 31 U. ToR. FAc. L. REv. 23 (1973). 
Through the generosity of the Canada-United States Law Institute I was able to spend 
considerable time in Canada. During those periods I talked with countless Canadian judges, 
lawyers and police officers, and I was afforded the opportunity of riding with police officers 
in Toronto. 
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ing in the United States and appears to be commencing in Canada re-
garding the proper method of dealing with police misconduct. 
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Governmental intrusion upon personal privacy has been an issue of 
national import and concern since before the formation of the republic. It 
was not thrust on the political scene, like so many issues in the twentieth 
century, by "have-nots" seeking reform of economic and political inequi-
ties. Nor is our national concern in this area the result of disclosures and 
propaganda discrediting police conduct. The issue has been alive in the 
United States for more than two hundred years and was introduced into 
the national debate by the aristocratic and middle-class revolutionaries 
who put an end to British rule and formed a new nation. Those eight-
eenth century patriots understood that the privacy issue did not involve 
narrow concerns but rather pertained to one of the most fundamental as-
pects of human endeavor. Initially precipitated by intrusions which were 
inhibiting the colonists' ability to accumulate wealth, the battle to secure 
and guarantee the right of privacy transcended the revolutionary war. It 
continued into the period of national development because of the foun-
ders' realization that the right of privacy involved the most basic issue of 
limited government-official abuse of power. 36 The full development of 
this right, as with most other individual rights, was postponed until the 
second half of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the seed was planted 
and nurtured long before the Supreme Court unveiled the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment as its prin-
cipal tool to weld the fifty states into one nation and for "putting flesh 
and blood on our ideals"37 through the application of the fundamental 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights to citizens when dealing with their state 
governments. 
A. The Revolutionary War Period 
The struggle to secure the right of privacy in the United States began 
as early as 1760. It stemmed from a policy of strict enforcement by the 
colonial government of its trade laws to curtail trade with France and 
Spain and protect the American market for British trade.38 This policy 
was enforced through the use of general search warrants created a cen-
tury earlier. These warrants authorized officials holding Writs of Assis-
tance to "go into any house, shop, cellar, warehouse or room, or other 
place, and in case of resistance, to break open doors, chests, trunks and 
other packages" to search for and seize "prohibited and uncustomed" 
36 See notes 51-54, infra. 
37 Shaefer, Comments 54 Kv. L.J. 521 (1966). 
38 N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-53 (1937). 
30 13 and 14 Car. II c.ll §5 (1662), 8 Pickering, Statutes at Large 81 (1763). 
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goods. 39 The Writs permitted unlimited intrusion into every segment of 
the colonists' lives by vesting limitless discretion in the enforcing customs 
officials. A search conducted under a warrant of this nature is as insidious 
as a warrantless search undertaken today by a peace officer solely upon 
his own decision and without statutory or judicially-imposed limitations. 
Customs officers were free to enter and search at will in the colonists' 
homes and businesses. No factual basis was required to justify the intru-
sion and no return of execution was required if no contraband was found. 
The Writ provided all of the necessary justification. The search under 
such a Writ signified that intrusions not based upon reasonable or proba-
ble cause were an element of governmental policy. Today, the arbitrary 
search by an officer without a warrant is the act of one official, and the 
victim of the intrusion may have recourse under the law. 40 
Resistance to Writs of Assistance developed shortly after commence-
ment of the vigorous enforcement of the customs laws. A legal challenge 
was brought in the Massachusetts Superior Court in 1761 by Boston 
merchants opposing the reissuance of the Writs. 41 The colonists' cause 
was argued by James Otis, Jr., who passionately developed the notion of 
individual privacy: 
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the 
freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, 
he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be 
declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege. Custom house of-
ficers may enter our houses when they please-we are commanded to 
permit their entry-their menial servants may enter-may break locks, 
bars and everything in their way-and whether they break through mal-
ice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire-bare suspicion without 
oath is sufficient .... Again these writs are not returned. Writs in their 
nature are temporary things; when the purposes for which they are is-
sued are answered, they exist no more; but these monsters in law live 
forever, no one can be called to account. Thus reason and the constitu-
tion are both against this writ.<• 
Otis' attack upon general searches was a lost battle, but his oration was 
credited by John Adams as the spark which generated the movement for 
independence. 43 The court reissued the Writs and its failure to heed Otis' 
advice provided the growing revolutionary movement with a continuing 
issue to rally support. 44 
A Town Meeting in Boston authorized a committee to compile and 
publish a list of "Infringements and Violations of Rights" in 1772. Signifi-
40 T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41-43 (1969). 
" Massachusetts is the only colony where Writs of Assistance were a continuing men-
ace. The courts in all of the colonies but Massachusetts and New Hampshire resisted re-
quests for their issuance. Nevertheless, judges friendly to the Crown occasionally granted 
them. LASSON, supra note 38 at 73-76. 
" TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 37. 
" LASSON, supra note 38, at 58-59. 
" !d. at 73. 
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cant attention was paid by the committee to the violation of the right of 
privacy by Crown officials "intrusted with power more absolute and arbi-
trary than ought to be lodged in the hands of any man or body of men 
whatsoever."45 The declaration described the effects upon the citizens of 
such a society where the individual's right of privacy is unprotected: 
Thus our houses and even our bed chambers, are exposed to be ran-
sacked, our boxes, chests & trunks broke open, ravaged and plundered by 
wretches, whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial 
servants; whenever they are pleased to say they suspect there are in the 
house wares & for which the dutys have not been paid. Flagrant in-
stances of the wanton exercise of this power, have frequently happened 
in this and other sea port Towns. By this we are cut off from that domes-
tick security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some mea-
sure agreable. Those Officers may under colour of law and the cloak of a 
general warrant, break thro' the sacred rights of the Domicil, ransack 
men's houses, destroy their securities, carry off their property, and with 
little danger to themselves commit the most horred murders.<• 
B. Nation Building 
Surprisingly, this issue which allegedly helped to spark the revolution 
was not mentioned in the Declaration of Independence, the compendium 
of the colonists' grievances. Between 1776 and the signing of the Treaty 
of Paris in 1783, however, seven of the former colonies47 inciuded in their 
declarations of rights condemnations of general search warrants and guar-
anteed in those documents the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. The Constitution as originally submitted to the 
states similarly made no mention of search and seizure nor, for that mat-
ter, of most of the rights later appended to it in the Bill of Rights. The 
absence of a Bill of Rights was not a result of malice but simply the prod-
uct of a group of men whose proceedings were not public and who, be-
cause they believed that what they were drafting was merely a charter for 
a government of limited powers, presumed that a statement of rights was 
unnecessary.48 That omission, however, seriously jeopardized the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution. The citizens of the various states had grown dis-
trustful of government, no less of the home-grown variety than of the 
foreign power they had recently dispossessed. In state after state, ratifica-
tion was opposed by those who were fearful of the so-called limited gov-
ernment. Patrick Henry conjured up a chamber of horrors in which re-
4
' B. ScHWARTZ, THE BILL oF RIGHTs: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 206 (1971). 
46 ld. at 45. 
47 Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and 
Vermont. 
4
' Both the original United States Constitution and the British North America Act 
have surface similarity, in that neither document deals with individual liberties. Of course, 
the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution makes these two docu-
ments quite distinguishable. 
112 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:103 
pressive state officials would be aided by powerful federal officers to 
deprive citizens of their privacy: 
When these harpies are aided by excisemen, who may search, at any 
time, your houses and most secret recesses, will the people bear it? If you 
think so, you differ from me. Where I thought there was a possibility of 
such mischiefs, I would grant power with a niggardly hand; and here 
there is a strong possibility that these oppressions shall actually happen. 
I may be told that it is safe to err on that side, because such regulations 
may be made by Congress as shall restrain these officers, and because 
laws are made by our representatives, and judged by righteous judges: 
but, sir, as these regulations may be made, so they may not; and many 
reasons there are to induce a belief that they will not. 49 
James Madison, who was eventually to author and serve as principal 
proponent of the Bill of Rights when it came before the Congress, had 
earlier questioned in a letter to Thomas Jefferson whether "parchment 
barriers" could have any effect upon "overbearing majorities" when "its 
control is most needed. "50 Jefferson replied to Madison with a timeless 
defense of the need for a written and entrenched statement of rights: 
Experience proves [critics say] the inefficacy of a Bill of Rights. 
True. But though it is not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, 
it is of great potency always, and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more 
will often keep up the building which would have fallen with that brace 
the less. There is a remarkable difference between the characters of the 
inconveniences which attend a declaration of rights, & those which at-
tend the want of it. The inconveniences of the declaration are that it may 
cramp government in its useful exertions. But the evil of this is short-
lived, trivial & reparable. The inconveniences of the want of a Declara-
tion are permanent, afflicting & irreparable. They are in constant pro-
gression from bad to worse. The executive in our governments is not the 
sole, it is scarcely the principal object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the 
legislatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for long 
years."' 
Opponents of the new Constitution rallied the opposition by accentuating 
the fears caused by the absence of a Bill of Rights. When the new govern-
ment under the Constitution began its operation in 1789 half of the for-
mer colonies were demanding an addition to the charter to contain soq~.e 
formal statement of individual rights. Five of the new states specifically 
included recommendations pertaining to a prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures or guidelines for the issuance of warrants.52 
•• LASSON, supra note 38, at 92. 
'" Id. at 78, n.91. 
01 S. PADOVER, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 105 
(1965). 
02 ScHWARTZ, supra note45, at 1167. 
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When the first Congress assembled, representing the eleven states 
that had ratified the Constitution, Congressman James Madison of Vir-
ginia, whose opposition to a Bill of Rights had been overcome either by 
Jefferson's persuasiveness or as a result of the fact that he had nearly 
been defeated in his bid for a House seat because of his early ambivalence 
to a Bill of Rights, became the sponsor and floor leader for such a state-
ment. Shortly after Washington's first inauguration, Madison submitted 
his first draft proposal. It has been suggested that had someone of lesser 
prestige and persistence than Madison championed the cause for a Bill of 
Rights in Congress, its enactment might not have occurred because of the 
Federalist majority's opposition in the Congress. 53 
Madison's proposal concerning searches and seizures contained all of 
the important words and phrases of what later was to become the Fourth 
Amendment, but in its original form it was clearly directed only to gen-
eral warrant searches, one of the principal grievances of the former colo-
nists.54 Deftly, through the mysteries of the committee process, the lan-
guage was transformed into its present form prohibiting all unreasonable 
searches and seizures, not just those resulting from improprieties in the 
warrant procedure. This change, of course, represents the greatest safe-
guard the Fourth Amendment holds, since. an overwhelming majority of 
police searches and seizures are without benefit of warrants. Had the 
broad prohibition against all unreasonable searches and seizures not been 
written into the amendment, it is conceivable that the Supreme Court 
might have determined that almost all arrests, searches and seizures were 
not subject to constitutional constraints.55 Whatever the principal fears 
and intent of the framers of the Fourth Amendment, the language ulti-
mately adopted would have to undergo tortuous construction today if the 
constitutional protection were to be denied to all but the few police intru-
sions covered by warrants. 
The adoption and subsequent ratification of the Fourth Amendment 
provided the tool for the development of the right of privacy and limita-
tions upon official intrusions into the private sector. The blossoming of 
that right, as well as the others enumerated in the Bill of Rights, de-
pended upon the development of the Supreme Court and the entire fed-
eral judiciary as the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution with the 
power to evaluate legislation in terms of its conformity with the Constitu-
tion and to measure the propriety of official conduct in light of constitu-
tional restraints. The entrenched position of the Constitution and the ac-
tivist role of the Supreme Court as a co-equal branch of government was 
53 LASSON, supra note 38, at 79-105. 
•• ScHWARTZ, supra note 45, at 1027. 
•• Professor Telford Taylor, see note 40 supra, contends that the Supreme Court 
turned the Fourth Amendment on its head when the Justices applied the constitutional 
standards intended to cover warrants to warrantless arrests and searches and also by exag-
gerating both the dangers of warrantless searches and the practical benefits of the warrant 
procedure. 
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clearly established early in the nineteenth century by Chief Justice Mar-
shall's landmark opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 56 providing both the 
tool and the machinery essential to the later maturing of these fundamen-
tal rights. 
C. Development of the Exclusionary Rule 
The underpinnings for all later decisions protecting the individual 
right of privacy appear in the 1886 United States Supreme Court deci-
sion, Boyd v. United States. 57 Boyd was decided under both the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments but the Court's reasoning relied most heavily 
upon the Fifth Amendment's explicit exclusion of compelled self-incrimi-
nation. A glimmer of the exclusionary rule appeared in federal and state 
decisions at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
century with statements such as: "These constitutional safeguards would 
be deprived of a large part of their value if they could be invoked only for 
preventing the obtaining of such evidence, and not for the protections 
against its use," 55 and "[Not to exclude] is to emasculate the constitu-
tional guaranty, and deprive it of all beneficial force or effect in prevent-
ing unreasonable searches and seizures."59 There are decisions during this 
period rejecting the exclusionary rule,60 but the impetus for its full evolu-
. tioD: and development existed in Boyd and other nineteenth century 
decisions. 
In 1914, the Court formally adopted the exclusionary rule in Weeks 
v. United States, 61 holding that evidence secured by federal law enforce-
ment officers in violation of an accused's Fourth Amendment rights could 
not be used in a federal criminal prosecution against that accused. The 
Weeks opinion did not adopt the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to ille-
gal police behavior. Rather, the Court simply treated the exclusionary 
rule as a logical corollary to the language of the Fourth Amendment and 
its guarantee of individual privacy. The Court discussed the importance 
of the Fourth Amendment and developed a charter setting forth the role 
of the courts in enforcing it: 
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the 
United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and 
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such 
power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures 
under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused 
of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory 
•• 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
'
7 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
•• United States v. Wong Quang Wong, 94 F. 832, 834 (9th Cir. 1899). 
•• State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (1903). 
89 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). 
61 232 u.s. 383 (1914). 
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upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the 
laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country 
to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confes-
sions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to un-
warranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Consti-
tution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are 
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which 
people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of 
such fundamental rights. 62 
115 
Furthermore, the Court said that while efforts to bring the guilty to pun-
ishment are praiseworthy, those efforts "are not to be aided by the sacri-
fice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffer-
ing which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of 
the Iand."63 
Clearly, then, the Supreme Court did not adopt the exclusionary rule 
principally to deter illegal police behavior, although it is fair to infer an 
expectation on the part of the Court that it would have that effect. The 
Court's primary reason appears to be a belief that if a trial court looks 
the other way and ignores the unconstitutional manner in which the evi-
dence in question is secured then the courts would be sanctioning "a 
manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Consti-
tution."64 The belief was that through such silence the courts would be-
come a party to the illegality and help to make it a fundamental right 
without a remedy. 
The appli~ability of the Weeks rule was limited to federal criminal 
trials. For thirty-four years thereafter there was no decision applying the 
general principles of the Fourth Amendment to the states through the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When such a decision 
was finally rendered in 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado 65 only the principle of 
freedom from unreasonable intrusions was made applicable to the states 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the 
federal remedy-the exclusionary rule. Despite the most egregious viola-
tions of the right, the states remained free to choose remedies to protect 
or not to protect that right. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary 
rule was not an explicit requirement of the Fourth Amendment but was a 
matter of judicial implication and thus not constitutionally mandated.66 
Even during this hands-off period, the Supreme Court fashioned an 
exclusionary rule, albeit very limited, which was applied to the states for 
certain extraordinarily unreasonable intrusions committed by state and 
local law enforcement officers. A unanimous Supreme Court in Rochin v. 
62 !d. at 391-392. 
6
' I d. at 393. 
6
' Id. at 394. 
66 338 u.s. 25 (1949}. 
•• Id. 
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California67 held that the conditions surrounding certain unreasonable 
searches and seizures required the suppression of the fruits of those in-
trusions in state criminal proceedings notwithstanding the general non-
applicability of the. exclusionary rule to the states. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, who wrote the majority opinion in Wolf, also wrote for five mem-
bers of the Rochin Court stating that a conviction based upon the fruits 
of illegal police behavior violated due process when the conduct of the 
police "shocked the conscience" of the Court and offended its sense of 
justice.68 In Rochin, police officers, without authority, entered the ac-
cused's home and jumped upon him in an unsuccessful attempt to extract 
two morphine capsules which he deliberately had swallowed to prevent 
their seizure. A subsequent stomach pumping by a doctor, against the 
accused's will, produced the morphine capsules. While not overruling 
Wolf, the Court was acknowledging that notions of due process, and thus 
the Constitution itself, required an exclusionary rule to protect the rights 
of citizens against some form of illegal police behavior. The inherent sub-
jectivity of the Rochin test became readily apparent when Justice Frank-
furter broke from the majority of the Court in a later case. The majority's 
conscience in that case was not "shocked" by illegal police behavior which 
involved the planting of hidden microphones in a suspect's marital bed-
room,69 rather than an atrocious invasion of the accused's body. 
The Supreme Court finally reversed Wolf in 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio.70 
Forty-seven years after the Court applied the exclusionary rule to federal 
criminal proceedings, it extended the exclusionary rule for Fourth 
Amendment violations to state criminal proceedings. By 1961 the atmo-
sphere in the Supreme Court was definitely changing;71 gone was the 
Court's reticence to find a broad and distinctive meaning in the Four-
teenth Amendment's guarantee against state violations of due process. 
The Court rejected the assertion in Wolf that the exclusionary rule was 
merely a creature of judicial implication and reasserted its earlier position 
developed in Weeks affirming the exclusionary rule's constitutional ori-
gins and justifications. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the fac-
tual considerations stressed in the Wolf opinion no longer existed. By 
1961, a majority of st~,ttes had applied the exclusionary rule on their own 
because, as the Court stressed, theother remedies failed to secure compli-
ance with the constitutional provision.72 The failure to apply the exclu-
67 342 u.s. 165 (1952). 
68 ld. at 172-173. 
00 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
70 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
71 Under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren, the Supreme Court assumed an ac-
tivist role expanding individual rights on several fronts. The greatest impact of this Court is 
felt in the areas of civil rights ·requiring desegregation of all public aspects of American life, 
reapportionment which ended the rural domination of state legislatures, and the application 
of the Bill of Rights to state criminal proceedings. 
72 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
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sionary rule, the Court said, was to make the right of privacy meaningless 
and amounted to a withholding of its privilege and enjoyment. Perhaps 
most profound in light of later criticism of the decision was the Court's 
insistence that permitting the introduction of illegally seized evidence 
served to encourage disobedience to the federal Constitution.73 
The years since Mapp have hardly been tranquil. Mapp v. Ohio re-
solved one issue and opened the door to many others. Search and seizure 
questions have predominated in criminal litigation just as the prosecution 
of crimes has dominated all areas of litigation and preoccupied the 
courts.74 
As an aftermath of Mapp, courts at every level have been compelled 
to spend considerable time on search and seizure issues and have had to 
expend considerable thought on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
guarantee. The legal community, particularly, and the lay community as 
well, have focused on the limits of permissible police behavior and by 
necessity on the meaning and parameters of the Fourth Amendment as-
surance of individual privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Perhaps the most noteworthy, yet frequently the most over-
looked effect of the exclusionary rule has been the spotlight it has focused 
upon the greater issue involving the relationship between citizens and po-
lice in a free society. Unlike any other approach to the consideration of 
these issues, the exclusionary rule provides a forum in which their consid-
eration is unavoidable. Motions to suppress evidence are filed in courts 
throughout this country every day, and within that context the issues 
must be faced. Along with issues of freedom and individual integrity, so-
ciety is also forced to face up to the cost of this freedom; and that cost is 
substantial. Every time it is determined that a police officer erred, either 
through blunder or intentionally, relevant and reliable evidence of guilt is 
excluded and a potentially guilty person may go free as a direct result of 
that police error. It is exceedingly healthy for a society to be continually 
faced with such basic issues of freedom and its costs. The exclusionary 
rule demands that society constantly reaffirm its commitment to individ-
ual freedom, as it daily reconsiders the basic questions as to when and 
under what circumstances police intrusions into individual privacy satisfy 
the constitutional test of reasonableness. 
In recent years, state and federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme 
Court, have persistently redefined reasonable police behavior to meet va-
rious sets of circumstances. Often the outcome has been to relax the re-
strictions upon police behavior in order to round the sharp edges of the 
exclusionary rule.75 Most recently, the Supreme Court has cut back on 
73 Id. 
74 Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 46 G.W.L. REv. 529 (1978); I D. NEDRUD & M. 0BERTO, THE SuPREME CoURT AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW (1979). 
70 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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the scope of the exclusionary rule, claiming that application of the exclu-
sionary rule to various proceedings will not help to deter illegal police 
practices.76 The most egregious and effective assault of the present Su-
preme Court upon the exclusionary rule has been its decision to bar 
Fourth Amendment claims from being raised in federal habeas corpus at-
tacks upon convictions.77 That decision is broad and wide-sweeping be-
cause the potential for collateral attack was the most potent weapon for 
ensuring the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights at crimi-
nal trials. Notwithstanding reinterpretations of constitutional standards 
and curtailment of the applicability of the exclusionary rule, the rule has 
been weakened but remains largely intact and continues to be the sub-
ject of widespread attack. 
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CANADA 
Contrary to the experience in the United States, the right to privacy 
and the concern over limitations upon police power to conduct searches 
and seizures have never been critical issues in Canada. Separation from 
England and the formation of the Dominion was not the wrenching ex-
perience that it was a century earlier in the United States. Privacy, or the 
lack thereof, and police illegality simply were not issues that arose in the 
making of an independent Canada. 
A. The Canadian Bill of Rights 
The Canadian Constitution is the British North America Act of 1868, 
legislation enacted by the British Parliament creating the Dominion of 
Canada and dividing the powers of government between the provincial 
governments and the newly created federal government.78 Like the fram-
ers of the American Constitution, the drafters of the BNA Act did not 
deem it necessary to include within its provisions guarantees of individual 
rights. The document concentrates upon defining the powers delegated to 
the federation and perpetuates the roles enjoyed by the provinces.79 Un-
like the American experience, Canada's Constitution was not greeted by a 
popular movement demanding its early amendment to include a state-
ment enumerating individual rights and guaranteeing the inviolability of 
those rights. 
Technically, the Canadian Constitution still resides in England; as an 
act of the British Parliament, it can only be amended by legislation of 
76 E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), where the Court declined to 
apply the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. 
77 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
" 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3, (1867). 
70 The Canadian Constitution guarantees that matters such as education and laws regu-
lating marriage remain within the sole jurisdiction of the provinces. The Constitution in-
sured that the provinces would be able to maintain their individual characteristics. B.N.A. 
Act, 30 & 31 Victoria, c.92(8), s.92(12). 
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that body. No one would suggest, however, that the British Parliament 
would attempt to exercise any discretion in this matter. Amendments are 
proposed to the British Parliament by the Canadian government but cus-
tom dictates that amendments will be enacted only if unanimously sup-
ported by the governments of the ten provinces. The unanimity require-
ment has impeded the amendment process and is the reason that the 
Canadian Bill of Rights was not made a part of the Constitution. 80 
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was the principai proponent of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights.81 Fearing that political factors would prevent 
unanimous provincial support for a constitutional amendment, Diefen-
baker proposed the Bill as an ordinary Act of Parliament. It was adopted 
in that form in 1960.82 
The Bill of Rights contains an enumeration of fundamental rights 
including those affecting the criminal process. The latter rights pertain 
exclusively to post-arrest procedures and guarantees of a fair trial.83 The 
Bill of Rights contains no specific reference to search and seizure. There 
is, however, a broad guarantee that life, liberty and security will not be 
deprived without due process of law. 84 Furthermore, section 5 provides 
that the specific enumeration of individual rights shall not be construed 
"to abrogate or abridge any human right or fundamental freedom not 
enumerated . . . that may have existed in Canada at the commencement 
of this Act."85 This document might be read so as to find the basis for 
enunciating support for a fundamental right to be free from unreasonable 
intrusions by relying upon the broad guarantee of due process as well as 
the reaffirmation of those rights not enumerated but existing at the time 
of the enactment of the Bill of Rights. However, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has not relied upon the document to chart a course developing 
protections for those rights that are enumerated, let alone rights that are 
not enumerated.86 
The BiW of Rights provides that every law of the Canadial'1 Parlia-
ment shall be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge, or 
infringe any of the rights or freedo.ms contained within the document. 
Thus, the Bill of Rights language could be read as at least constructing a 
framework within which to test the validity of other Acts of Parliament. 87 
Nonetheless, even that narrow role may be limited because a provision in 
80 D. CREIGHTON, supra note 9, at 315. 
81 Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights: From Diefenbaker to Drybones, 17 Mc-
GILL L.J. 437 (1971). 
•• D. CREIGHTON, supra note 9, at 315. 
83 Canadian Bill of Rights (C.B.R.) CAN. REv. STAT. App. III (1970), §2. 
8
' /d. Part I §1(a). 
•• !d. Part II, §5. 
86 Laskin, The Canadian Bill of Rights: A Dilemma for the Courts, 2 INT'L & CoMP. 
L.Q. 519 (1962). 
87 Bowles, Our Courts and Our Parliament View The Canadian Bill of Rights, 1 MAN. 
L.S.J. 55 (1962-1965). 
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the Bill of Rights, itself, specifies that Parliament may expressly declare 
that a statute "shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of 
Rights."88 The Supreme Court of Canada has been reluctant to employ 
the Bill of Rights to challenge the scope of parliamentary supremacy, 
even when enumerated, fundamental rights are at stake.89 With rare ex-
ception, the Supreme Court of Canada has_ shown great timidity when 
reviewing Acts of Parliament and determining whether they conform to 
the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 00 This has prompted one 
scholar to claim that the Court simply is not making the assessments that 
Parliament expected of it when it enacted the Bill of Rights.111 
In light of the reluctance the Supreme Court has shown in fulfilling 
its specified obligation to review federal legislation, it is hardly surprising 
that the Court has not expanded the impact of the Bill of Rights to in-
clude review of police practices and provincial legislation. One case in 
particular, Hogan v. The Queen,92 demonstrates the Bill of Rights' negli-
gible role in the area of police conduct. Hogan was arrested for drunken 
driving93 and taken to a police station for a breathalyzer test. Before the 
test was administered Hogan's companion called his lawyer who promptly 
arrived at the police station. Hogan requested an opportunity to consult 
with the lawyer whom he knew was at the station. The police conducting 
the test refused permission, telling Hogan that he did not have the right 
to see anyone before the test. They further advised Hogan that if he re-
fused to take the test he would face an additional criminal charge based 
upon his refusal to comply.94 Hogan then complied with the police direc-
tive without consulting with his attorney. 
At trial, Hogan's counsel argued that the breathalyzer test results 
were inadmissible because they were obtained in violation of the right to 
counsel guaranteed by the Canadian Bill of Rights. Section 2(c)(iii) of the 
Bill provides that "no law shall be construed or applied so as to deprive a 
person who has been arrested or detained of the right to retain and in-
struct counsel without delay." The Supreme Court of Canada did not dis-
pute that the results of the breathalyzer test, the evidence upon which 
the conviction rested, were illegally obtained in violation of a right enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights. Nevertheless the Court affirmed the convic-
tion without exclusion of the evidence. The Court reached this result even 
while acknowledging that its earlier landmark ruling in Regina v. 
Drybones95 "accorded a degree of paramountcy to the provisions of [the 
•• C.B.R. CAN. R~cv. STAT. App. III (1970). 
80 W. TARNOPOLSKY, supra note 11, at 67 (1966). 
00 Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen, [1963) S.C.R. 651; Canada v. Lavell, 38 
D.L.R. 3d 481 (1973); cf. Regina v. Drybones, 9 D.L.R. 3d 473 (1970). 
•• Tarnopolsky, supra note 81. 
02 48 D.L.R. 3d 427 (1974). 
03 REV. STAT. CAN. c.34, s.236 (1970). 
•• 48 D.LR. 3d at 430 (1974). 
•• 9 D.L.R. 3d 473 (1970). 
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Bill of Rights] .... "96 Then by way of dismissing that paramountcy Jus-
tice Ritchie, for the majority said: 
[W]hatever view may be taken of the constitutional impact of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights, ... I cannot agree that, wherever there has 
been a breach of one of the provisions of that Bill, it justifies the adop-
tion of the rule of 'absolute exclusion' on the American model which is in 
derogation of the common law rule long accepted in this country."7 
Rather than according supremacy to the explicit provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, the Canadian Supreme Court in Hogan relegated them to the sta-
tus of excess baggage by granting those sections less impact than a com-
mon law rule of evidence. 
One commentator disagreed with the preeminence accorded to the 
common law rule of evidence: "[I] cannot see how, even if the Canadian 
Bill of Rights were deemed to be a mere statutory enactment, a Canadian 
court could possibly conclude that a common law rule cannot be over-
ruled by a statutory enactment, and a subsequent one at that."98 The 
Court's reluctance to review the police officer's conduct in the Hogan case 
in light of the Bill of Rights creates what has been described by Professor 
Walter Tarnopolsky as an anomalous result when attempting to reconcile 
that decision with the Court's earlier pronouncement in Drybones. If Par-
liament were to enact a provision in the Criminal Code denying a sus-
pect's right to consult with counsel before taking a breathalyzer test, that 
provision would be inoperative according to Drybones because it is incon-
sistent with the Bill of Rights. But when that fundamental right is vio-
lated by a police officer acting on his own initiative without legislative 
authorization, the decision in Hogan dictates that the Canadian Bill of 
Rights be ignored. 99 
Justice Laskin, now Chief Justice, criticized the Court's readiness to 
give greater importance to a common law rule of evidence than to a provi-
sion of the Bill of Rights. In his dissent he discussed the constitutional 
issues involved. He concluded that judicial development of an exclusion-
ary rule is the only means of protecting constitutional rights. His reason-
ing might serve as the basis for future arguments by U.S. as well as Cana-
dian proponents of the rule because it deals with the intrinsic worth of 
such a rule despite its shortcomings. 
The American exclusionary rule, in enforcement of constitutional 
guarantees, is as much a judicial creation as was the common law of ad-
missibility. It is not dictated by the Constitution, but its rationale ap-
pears to be that the constitutional guarantees cannot be adequately 
served if their vindication is left to civil actions in tort or criminal prose-
•• 48 D.L.R. 3d at 434 (1974). 
07 Id. 
•• Tarnopolsky, The Supreme Court and Ciuil Liberties, 14 ALBERTA L. REv. 58, 87-88 
(1976). 
•• Id. at 89. 
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cutions, and that a check rein on illegal police activity which invades 
constitutional rights can best be held by excluding evidence obtained 
through such invasions. Whether this has resulted or can result in secur-
ing oi improving respect for constitutional guarantees is not an easy 
question to answer .... 
It may be said that the exclusion of relevant evidence is no way to 
control illegal police practices and that such exclusion merely allows a 
wrongdoer to escape conviction. Yet where constitutional guarantees are 
concerned, the more pertinent consideration is whether those guarantees, 
as fundamentals of the particular society, should be at the mercy of law 
enforcement officers and a blind eye turned to their invasion because it is 
more important to secure a conviction. The contention that it is the duty 
of the Courts to get at the truth has in it too much of the philosophy of 
the end justifying the means; it would equally challenge the present law 
as to confessions and other out-of-Court statements by an accused. In 
the United States, its Supreme ·court, after weighing over many years 
whether other methods than exclusion of evidence should be invoked to 
deter illegal searches and seizures in state as well as in federal prosecu-
tions, concluded that the constitutional guarantees could best be upheld 
by a rule of exclusion. 100 
Finally, Justice Laskin discussed the role that the courts must play in 
enforcing the Bill of Rights, accorded quasi-constitutional status by 
Drybones. Since the Canadian Bill, like the American Bill of Rights, does 
not embody any sanctions for the enforcement of its terms, Justice Las-
kin propounded that it must be the function of the courts to determine 
what impact the Canadian Bill of Rights is to have. 101 
The Canadian Bill of Rights is only two decades old. Just as the 
broad, expansive view as advanced in Drybones in 1970 has been eroded, 
Hogan too, is unlikely to be the last word on the status of the Bill of 
Rights. There is opposition, even among civil libertarians, however, to 
turning the Canadian Bill of Rights into entrenched legislation with an 
activist Supreme Court imposing it as a constitutional document. Profes-
sor Douglas Schmeiser has written, "[i]t is also not unfair to point out 
that the English tradition, where people look to Parliament as the cham-
pion of liberty, has in fact led to a far freer society than the American 
tradition which looks to the courts for protection."102 Instead, Professor 
Schmeiser looks to other institutions for the protection of individual 
rights, including human rights commissions, ombudsmen, and law reform 
commissions. He points to the American experience where he claims that 
the United States Supreme Court, in applying the Constitution, blocked 
needed social reform. 103 
100 48 D.L.R. 3d at 442-43. 
101 !d. at 443. 
102 Schmeiser, Entrenchment of a Bill of Rights: Disadvantages of an Entrenched Ca-
nadian Bill of Rights, 33 SASK. L. REV. 247, 251 (1968). 
103 It would be fairer to say that, on the whole, Americans have been able to look to the 
Supreme Court as well as to the Congress as champions of liberty. In general, the American 
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B. A Rule of Admissibility 
The rule in Hogan demonstrates an unwillingness to fashion a consti-
tutional basis for the exclusion of evidence. At the same time common 
law rules have been developed by the Canadian Supreme Court which 
result in the almost total inclusion of reliable evidence without any con-
sideration given in a criminal trial for the manner in which the evidence 
was secured. Consequently, Canadian law on the subject of search and 
seizure has not experienced the explosive development that the law has 
undergone in the United States. In fact, the Canadian law on search and 
seizure resembles the nineteenth century English common law prevailing 
when Canada became an independent nation, more closely than it does 
current English law. 
The principal differences between Canadian and U.S. law dealing 
with privacy is that Canadian law permits the use in a criminal trial of 
evidence acquired through unreasonable searches and seizures. The prin-
cipal difference between Canadian law on the subject and its English 
counterpart is that Canadian judges are granted virtually no discretion 
and must permit the prosecution to use such evidence notwithstanding 
how it came into the government's possession, while English judges are 
granted the discretion, even if only in exceptional cases, to exclude evi-
dence resulting from aggravated illegal SearcheS and SeizureS.104 . 
The Canadian rule was set forth in a 1970 Supreme Court decision, 
Queen u. Wray, 105 which determined whether a murder weapon which the 
police were led to through an involuntary confession was admissible in 
evidence at the accused's trial. The majority pointed out that the invol-
untary confession was inadmissible because such evidence is not reliable, 
but held that all other evidence which is reliable and relevant is admissi-
ble regardless of how the prosecuting authorities acquired it. The Court 
purportedly did not strip trial judges of all discretion to suppress evi-
dence. It held that if the challenged evidence operates unfairly against an 
accused, it may be excluded by the trial judge. According to the Court's 
definition, illegally seized evidence ~hich operates unfairly against an ac-
cused is limited to evidence "the admissibility of which is tenuous, and 
experience does not support Professor Schmeiser's contention. It is certainly true that at 
times the Supreme Court has blocked social reform, but in those instances it has delayed 
and not caused a permanent deferral. Freedom has been most jeopardized in the United 
States during periods when the Supreme Court failed to utilize the Constitution as a buffer 
between individual rights and freedoms and the actions of other branches of the federal 
government and the state governments often prompted by the over-zealousness of the ma-
jority. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). In balance, an activist 
Supreme Court enforcing the Constitution has served American society well, and has been 
an almost constant source for the strengthening of individual freedoms and protection from 
official oppression. 
104 Jeffrey v. Black, [1978] 1 All ER 555. 
105 11 D.L.R. 3d 673 (1970). 
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whose probative force in relation to the main issue before the Court is 
trifling."106 By defining so restrictively what sort of evidence may be ex-
cluded, the Court diminished the opportunity for a trial judge to exercise 
meaningful discretion. A vigorous dissent, relying upon the same English 
cases cited in Justice Martland's majority opinion, asserted that the rule 
in Wray represented a departure from the English apprdach.107 Although 
he was not on the Canadian Supreme Court at the time of Wray, a state-
ment in Chief Justice Laskin's later dissent in Hogan stands as a com-
mentary upon the policies underlying the Wray majority's handling of a 
trial judge's discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence: 
The choice of policy here is to favour the social interest in the re-
pression of crime despite the unlawful invasion of individual interests 
and despite the fact that the invasion is by public officers charged with 
law enforcement. Short of legislative direction, it might have been ex-
pected that the common law would seek to balance the competing inter-
ests by weighing the social interest- in the particular case against the 
gravity or character of the invasion, leaving it to the discretion of the 
trial Judge whether the balance should be struck in favour of reception 
or exclusion of particular evidence.108 
The effect of a general rule of admissibility is to remove from the 
context of a criminal case any inquiry into the manner in which the pros-
ecuting authorities obtained the evidence to be used in attempting to con-
vict an accused and possibly deprive him of his liberty. The underlying 
justification for this approach is premised upon the belief that a criminal 
trial is not the proper forum in which to evaluate the conduct of the po-
lice in bringing the accused to court. 109 The propriety of police methods is 
simply considered irrelevant when considering the accused's guilt or inno-
cence. The virtual elimination of a trial judge's discretion to consider the 
propriety of police and prosecutor conduct signifies a total commitment 
to the guilt-determining function of a criminal trial. This approach is 
characteristic of a criminal justice system that emphasizes order and 
crime control. 
C. Writs of Assistance 
The continued existence in Canada of Writs of Assistance is further 
evidence of that society's deemphasis of due process in favor of crime 
control. No other feature of Canadian criminal justice is likely to have as 
great an impact upon an American observer than -the continued vitality of 
the Writs. They were a factor in the American Revolution, and the 
100 Id. at 689-90. 
107 ld. at 681. 
108 48 D.L.R. 3d, at 442. 
100 McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill-Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. 
GRIM. L.C. & P.S. 266 (1961). 
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The enormity of the power conferred by the Writs of Assistance must 
be read in the context of a system that does not exclude froin criminal 
trials the fruits of illegal searches and seizures. While the absence of an 
exclusionary rule does not confer additional powers on the holder of this 
extraordinary Writ, it does virtually assure the officer who conducts a 
search under authority of a Writ that his exercise of discretion to make 
the search will never be reviewed. For example, the Customs and Excise 
Acts authorize searches of "any building or other place"121 and the Nar-
cotic Control and Food and Drug Acts authorize searches of "any dwell-
ing house."122 To gain entry or when once in the house, to enter rooms, 
the Narcotic Control Act empowers the officer with a Writ of Assistance 
to "break open any door, window, lock, fastener, floor, wall, ceiling, com-
partment, plumbing fixture, box, container or any other thing."123 Thus 
officers are empowered, without prior judicial authorization or subsequent 
judicial review, to dismantle a house on their own decision. 
As a result, the holder of the Writ is vested with virtual plenary 
power to decide on his own whether there is reasonable cause to warrant 
a search and then to conduct that search with almost equal assurance 
that there will be no subsequent judicial review of either the conclusion 
that reasonable cause existed or the manner in which the search was con-
ducted. The Writs have been used most extensively to search for mari-
juana and other drugs. This use has raised considerable controversy stem-
ming from allegations of excessively zealous conduct. 124 
D. The Right of Privacy Act-Exception to the Wray Case 
The Canadian Parliament carved out a narrow exception to the gen-
eral rule formulated in Wray that all reliable evidence is admissible with-
out concern for the methods used by the police. The Right of Privacy 
Act125 pertains to electronic, mechanical and other devices used for eaves-
dropping. It reflects the legislature's view that at least this type of illegal 
intrusion into individual privacy is so heinous that the government may 
not use the fruits of that illegality, i.e., the seized conversation, as evi-
dence in a criminal case. 
Assistance, 19 CHITTY's L. J. 90 (1971); Case Comment and Notes, Writs of Assistance in 
Canada, 9 ALBERTA L. REV. 386 (1971). 
121 CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, §139, c.E-12, §2 (1970). 
m CAN. REv. STAT. c.N-1 §10(3), c.F-27 §37(3) (1970). 
123 CAN. REv. STAT. c.N-1, §10(4) (1970). 
'" This over-zealousness does not guarantee that the police activity will be successful 
even on basic crime prevention and detection levels. An example of this type of weak har-
vest de.spite a large scale police action is described in Ryval, Five Shocking Cases, QuEST 17 
(April 1979). The article reports a raid, on May 11, 1974 by fifty police on the Landmark 
Motor Inn Hotel outside of Fort Erie, Ontario. Under the authority of Writs of Assistance 
police conducted searches of 115 individuals, including thirty-six vaginal searches. A grand 
total of six ounces of marijuana was found, and only seven individnals were charged with 
crimes. The charges ranged from possession of marijuana to drinking under age. 
"' CRIMINAL ConE, CAN. REv. STAT. c.C-34 §§ 178.1-178.23 (1976). 
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The Act requires prior judicial authorization for wiretaps and bans 
the use of illegally obtained interceptions in criminal prosecutions against 
the originator or intended receiver of the communication. However, the 
Right of Privacy Act not only creates an exclusionary rule, it also grants 
trial judges discretion to avoid the impact of the exclusionary rule. If the 
evidence is relevant to the issues at stake in the criminal trial, the judge 
has discretion to permit the use of that evidence, notwithstanding the 
illegality of the means, if the illegality arose by virtue of a defect in the 
application for judicial authorization or the procedures involved.126 That 
type of discretion is understandable and may be reasonable, but the Act 
goes further. The exception also authorizes the trial judge to exercise his 
discretion to admit relevant evidence, other than the communication it-
self but derived from the initial communication, if excluding it may re-
sult in justice not being done. 127 In this context one must assume that 
the contemplated injustice would be the inability to convict a person 
guilty as charged without the derivative evidence. 128 In essence, then, the 
exclusionary rule provided under the Privacy Act is virtually limited to 
the illegally intercepted communication where the illegality stems from a 
substantive error or an act of bad faith rather than a defect in form. De-
rivative evidence is virtually always admissible if it is relevant to the case 
and critical to the prosecution. 
E. Canadian Remedies for Illegal Searches and Seizures 
Absent an exclusionary rule barring the use of the fruits of illegal 
police intrusions, Canada looks to other means to protect its fundamental 
right of privacy. Canadian law and custom provide alternative remedies: 
motion to quash, tort suit, criminal prosecution of offending officers, and 
internal police discipline.129 None of these alternative remedies is un-
known to the American experience. 130 
A motion to quash a search warrant is only available, of course, 
where the allegedly illegal search was based upon a defective warrant. As 
under U.S. law a defect in the warrant may be premised upon a number 
of things, such as: failure to identify the crime committed and for which 
the evidence is sought; failure to specify with particularity the items to be 
searched for or the location to be searched, or failure to present to the 
magistrate or justice of the peace the underlying circumstances which 
support the officer's belief and upon which the issuing judicial officer may 
126 !d. § 178.16(2)(b) (1976). 
127 !d. § 178.16(2)(c) (1976). 
"' For a discussion that attempts to determine under what conditions § 178.16(2)(c) 
could or should be used see, Delisle, Evidentiary Implications of Bill C-176, 16 CRIM. L.Q. 
260 (1973-74). 
120 Gibson, Illegally Obtained Evidence, 31 U. ToR. FAc. L. REv. 23 (1973); Spiotto, 
supra note 20. 
"" See, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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form his own conclusion as to whether reasonable cause exists. 131 If the 
warrant is quashed, the proper remedy is an order returning the seized 
items. However, as the evidence may be used in a criminal prosecution 
irrespective of the manner in which it was seized, the court may order 
either that the items seized be held pending prosecution or that a new 
warrant be issued authorizing the seizure of the returned evidence.132 
Consequently, a motion to quash is more a check upon judicial officers 
who issue search warrants than upon the police. As a remedy, its thera-
peutic value may be limited to reminding the issuers of warrants of their 
responsibilities in the process. The illusory nature of the remedy is likely 
to discourage victims of searches predicated upon invalid warrants from 
using the motion because, even if the warrant is ruled defective and 
therefore invalid, the victory is meaningless. Few criminal defendants are 
interested in moral victories. 
Citizens must resort principally to the traditional tort remedy when 
they are the victims of illegal searches and seizures. American critics of 
the exclusionary rule advocate variations of the common law tort remedy 
as replacement for the exclusionary rule. 133 Use of a civil suit as a princi-
pal means of enforcing fundamental rights makes society dependent upon 
the willingness of individuals whose rights have been violated to come 
forward and expend the effort and resources to vindicate those rights.134 
Moreover, that dependence rests upon a class of citizens, those who are 
most likely to be subjected to intrusions of this nature-the young, mi-
norities, and street people, who are also the least likely to seek legal re-
dress for these wrongs. Awards of damages are likely to be minimal and 
proof of the violation difficult or nearly impossible to produce. 
An American commentator, James E. Spiotto, has written, "Canada's 
experience with the tort remedy suggests that viable alternatives to the 
131 For a good, brief discussion of the warrant process see, R. SALHANY, CANADIAN CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE (2d), 38-39 (1972). 
132 Even where warrants are required and utilized, judicial review of the warrant proce-
dure on a Motion to Quash is hardly rigorous. While reviewing courts strictly require that 
the warrant specify the crime which is being or has been committed, the inquiry is not 
substantial as to anything else. Specificity, of the same order, is not demanded as to the 
items to be searched for. The officer's grounds which give rise to the reasonable cause do not 
seem to be presented in a manner which would enable a judge to arrive at an independent 
conclusion that reasonable grounds exist to authorize the issuance of the warrant. To some-
one used to American decisions which demand that the underlying circumstances which 
justify the affiant's belief that a warrant should be issued be set forth for the court, some 
Canadian decisions denying the Motion to Quash almost seem to be implicitly based upon 
the notion that because the contraband or other evidence was found, reasonable cause ex-
isted to issue the warrant. See also, Re Den Hoy Gin, 47 C.R. 89 (Ont. Ct. App. 1965). 
133 See, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
1
·" Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 755 (1970); Schwartz, Complaints Against the Police: Experience of the 
Community Rights Division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, 118 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1023 (1970). 
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exclusionary rule do exist."135 Mr. Spiotto offered that conclusion despite 
his survey of Canadian law which turned up no appellate case involving a 
tort action against police officers for illegal searches and seizures in the 
Province of Ontario, only two appellate cases in the other Canadian prov-
inces, and a statement from a police commissioner that he could not re-
member any illegal search and seizure tort suits since the 1950s. In fact, 
the only suit which the commissioner could remember from the 1950s re-
sulted in a finding against the police officers but the award of damages 
was only one dollar. 136 Perhaps that damage award is the best explanation 
for the paucity of tort suits. 
A more recent, although very modest, empirical inquiry into this sub-
ject casts continuing doubt upon the viability of the tort suit as an alter-
native remedy in Canada. That study, conducted by the Canadian Civil 
Liberties Union, involved interviews during a five year period with per-
sons in Ontario claiming to have suffered from police abuse-not only 
invasions of personal privacy but more grievous claims as well.137 An over-
whelming majority of those persons interviewed indicated no intention to 
seek legal redress for these alleged violations. Most of them felt that it 
would do no good to complain or take legal action. While it has been 
claimed that Canadian juries become incensed at police abuse of citizens, 
apparently the alleged victims of these abuses are not as confident that 
the outrage. will extend to their cases, or at least not confident enough to 
bring suit. Like their neighbors in the United States, victims of illegal 
searches and seizures in Canada simply do not look to the civil process for 
redress. Moreover, when the intrusion turns up contraband or other in-
criminating evidence, even if there was insufficient justification for the 
search, this group is hardly likely to appear as sympathetic plaintiffs. 
The remaining Canadian alternatives to the exclusionary rule are also 
well known to the American legal community. Criminal prosecution of the 
offending officer is a possibility, but it is not utilized for invasions of indi-
vidual privacy in Canada any more than in the United States. Canadian 
prosecutors are not even likely to be privy to the facts surrounding the 
manner in which evidence was secured because the issue will not surface. 
Police illegality is simply not relevant to the criminal case. The informa-
tion is likely to come to the prosecutor's attention only in cases involving 
the grossest abuse. Even then the prosecutors merely tend ·to refer the 
matter to the police department for internal discipline.138 
Internal control of police officers by departmental hierarchy may be 
more of a reality in Canada than in the United States. Patrol officers, at 
least in Toronto, appear to exercise less plenary authority than their 
m Spiotto, supra note 20, at 49. 
"' I d. at 45, n.46. 
"' Canadian Civil Liberties Ass'n (CCLA), Metropolitan Toronto Police Practices, 
(Jan. 14, 1976). 
138 ld. 
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American counterparts. There are more supervisory officers responding to 
calls and overseeing beat officers' responses to routine CE!-lls. Whether the 
same situation exists in other cities is a matter of conjecture. Individual 
officers of the Toronto Metropolitan Police Authority appeared to be very 
comfortable under the eye of supervisory officers. They respond to it in a 
very natural manner, as though it is the established and accepted way of 
policing in that city. 
Toronto citizens who feel aggrieved about police behavior may file 
complaints directly with the department's compiaint bureau. This office 
is located apart from any other police-related function and the members 
wear civilian clothes. Personnel in the Toronto complaint bureau evi-
denced a real understanding and commitment to their task. They seem 
acutely uncomfortable as they wonder whether they are police officers or 
police watchers. But even if this understanding and commitment is genu-
ine, and it has been documented that this has not always been the case, 
the Complaint Bureau's ability to handle police misconduct is limited. 
Complaints frequently arise where only one officer and the complainant 
are present. The Complaint Bureau will not rule against the officer or 
make findings in that type of situation. Even where there are more of-
ficers present, one Royal Commission of Inquiry found that "[t]here is a 
tendency among policemen to cover up each other's errors and to keep 
silent concerning improper actions of brother officers."139 Even in To-
ronto, where the Complaint Bureau is dedicated, the personnel seemed to 
feel that they were limited and that too often their hands were tied. The 
Royal Commission has found the complaint procedure to be totally lack-
ing and recommended that the Bureau be taken out of the.internal con-
trol of the police department and be assigned to an independent agency 
charged with investigation and review of police conduct. The Commission 
. also recommended creation of an independent tribunal for the hearing of 
complaints. 140 While the recommendations have led to some changes in 
the manner of operation of the Complaint Bureau, such as its physical 
separation from the rest of the police department, the Complaint Bureau 
continues to function much as before; although, perhaps the commitment 
and sense of i1. dependence of the personnel in the Bureau may have re-
sulted indirectly from the earlier criticism leveled against the Bureau. 
Citizens do have an additional place to take their complaints about 
police behavior as well as other alleged wrongs or injustices committed by 
government officials. They can go to the provincial ombudsman. 141 Thus, 
the visibility of agenCies for citizen complaints against police is markedly 
different from comparable operations in many American cities. Often in 
the United States, citizen complaints are swallowed in the police bureau-
cracy and the complainant frequently never hears anything further about 
139 R. MoRAND, THE RoYAL CoMMISSION INTO METROPOLITAN ToRONTO PoLicE PRAC-
TICES 137 (1976). 
"
0 Id. at 226, 267. 
"' Schmeiser, supra note 102, at 249. 
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the matter. However, like their American counterparts, Canadian police 
vigorously oppose civilian-controlled police review boards. 
Despite the variety of alternative remedies, there is simply no way ot 
knowing whether the remedies are any more effective in Canada than 
they were in the United States before the Court ruled in Mapp u. Ohio. 142 
One critic, Chief Justice Laskin, again in his dissent in Hogan, expressed 
doubts: "They are said to have their sanction in separate criminal or civil 
proceedings, of which there is little evidence, either as to recourse or ef-
fectiveness; or, perhaps, in internal disciplinary proceedings against of-
fending constables, a matter on which there is no reliable data in this 
country."143 
IV. CRITICISM OF THE AMERICAN ExcLUSIONARY RULE 
Whether Canada ever elects to adopt an exclusionary rule will de-
pend upon many factors. Although none of the Canadian proposals for an 
exclusionary rule envisions or advocates acceptance of the broad rule now 
existing in the United States, 144 one factor in the consideration of nar-
rower rules may be Canadian perception of how the American rule func- · 
tions. The three arguments most often voiced in the United States 
against perpetuation of the exclusionary rule are that: ~1) the cost to soci-
ety is too great; (2) the exclusionary rule does not have the desired deter-
rent effect, and (3) the rule detracts from the ability of the police to pro-
vide effective law enforcement. 146 
There can be no doubt that the cost of the exclusionary rule to this 
society is substantiaJ.I 46 Guilty persons do go free both as a result of po-
lice blunders and intentional misconduct. There are benefits derived from 
the payment of such cost, however, which have largely remained un-
stated. On one level the exclusionary rule is a statement about the values 
and priorities of this society. The rule demonstrates that we take at least 
"
2 367 U.S. 643 (1961) . 
.., 48 D.L.R. 3d 442 (1974). 
w See, Can. B. Assn. Res. No. 2, (Aug. 1978), stating that if evidence is "obtainep 
unlawfully, contrary to due process of law, or under such circumstancesthat its use in the 
proceedings would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute" it should be 
excluded. Canadian Law Reform Commission, The Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evi-
dence, (1974), urged the reversal of Wray and to employ in its place an exclusionary rule 
based upon trial judges' discretion. 
'" Wilkey, Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 13 PROSECUTOR 124 (1977); cf., Kamisar, A 
Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 CRIM. L. BuLL. 5 (1979). 
that 
"" In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976), Chief Justice Burger, concurring, stated 
Over the years, the strains imposed by reality, in terms of the costs to society and 
the bizarre miscarriages of justice that have been experienced because of the ex-
clusion of reliable evidence when the "constable blunders," have led the Court to 
vacillate as to the !ationale for diliberate exclusion of truth from the factfinding 
process. 
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some of our constitutional guarantees so seriously and conscientiously 
that we are prepared to pay the price for noncompliance. It is always 
perplexing though, why the cost-benefit argument has not been translated 
into a demand for greater police compliance with the Fourth Amendment 
standards. Instead of focusing upon the police misconduct those offering 
the cost analysis focus on the loss of convictions. 
Perhaps it can be argued that this society must abandon the exclu-
sionary rule because crime is out-of-hand. Before making such a decision, 
however, its full ramifications must be understood. Would such a decision 
amount to a renunciation of the principles of the Fourth Amendment and 
along with it an abandonment of reasonableness as the benchmark for 
government intrusions? It is often forgotten that the exclusionary rule in 
no way sets the limits on police conduct; it merely enforces the limits that 
have been set under the Fourth Amendment's explicit standard of reason-
ableness. The standard of reasonableness has been subject to constant 
reinterpretation since the application of the exclusionary rule to the 
states in 1961. The process of reinterpretation began even during the ten-
ure of Chief Justice Warren, 147 and has been continued with greater speed 
and relish by the present Court. 148 Perhaps, reinterpretation is simply a 
euphemism for watering down the standard of reasonableness and re-
laxing Fourth Arpendment restrictions. 149 Notwithstanding these efforts, 
opposition to the exclusionary rule has grown. 150 The remedy, the exclu-
sionary rule, may be for some a surrogate target. The true target may well 
be the constitutional standard of reasonableness; for if the remedy is 
abolished, the constitutional standard will no longer be effective or 
threatening. 
A recent study conducted by the United States General Accounting 
Office,161 the investigative arm of the United States Congress, questions 
the claim of countless lost convictions. Conducted at the request of Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy, whose Senate Judiciary Committee staff is consid-
ering legislative alternatives to the exclusionary rule, the study indicates 
that the cost may not be as great as has been assumed. Focusing only on 
'" Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 555 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 
(1967). 
148 See note 16, supra. 
140 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., 
California v. Minjares, 100 S.Ct. 9, 11 (1979), where Justice Rehnquist made the surprising 
observation that "[t]he Court certainly could have held that discovery of the articles sought 
is compelling evidence that the search was justified .... " 
150 See note 16, supra. 
151 The findings of the G.A.O. report are summarized in 25 CR. L. RPTR. 2185 (May 
1979). The G.A.O. study is also analyzed in NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1979, at 86. Professor 
Kamisar is quoted in the article as stating, "It's nice to have a government study which 
shows that the cost of protecting these rights is so low." The article mentions a Law En-
forcement Assistance Administration study of police departments in Los Angeles, Washing-
ton, D.C., New Orleans, Salt Lake County, Utah, and Cobb County, Georgia, which arrives 
at conclusions similar to the G.A.O. report. 
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cases in federal courts, the study found that evidence was excluded in 
only 1.3 percent of the cases. In those few cases, however, where a motion 
to suppress was granted and the evidence was excluded, convictions were 
obtained in less than half of the cases. Thus, it is clear that exclusion is 
still costly. Equally significant, however, is that evidence is excluded in 
surprisingly few cases. 
The relatively small impact of the exclusionary rule upon litigated 
cases raises the possibility that a great number of cases involving bad 
searches are being screened out by United States Attorneys who are re-
fusing to prosecute in those cases. The G.A.O. anticipated that inquiry 
and examined the impact of bad searches upon screening. Again, the ex-
clusionary rule had surprisingly little impact. The G.A.O. reported that 
search and seizure problems are indicated as the primary reason for decli-
nation in only about 0.4 percent of the total of declined cases. 
Notwithstanding the singular nature of these findings, the cost issue 
should not be summarily dismissed. Its impact is probably greater in 
state courts where the bulk of prosecutions arising out of on-the-street 
encounters and car searches takes place. However, the G.A.O. study does 
indicate that at least at one level of government, the costs of the exclu-
sionary rule are surprisingly low.152 
The second argument is that the exclusionary rU:le has not served as 
an effective deterrent to illegal behavior and therefore should not be re-
tained.153 This theory is premised upon the belief that the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule was to deter illegal police behavior, and that since it has 
not done that, there is no valid reason to persist in a costly futile gesture. 
Although language in Supreme Court opinions justifying cutbacks in the 
scope of the exclusionary rule supports this premise, it is clearly errone-
ous. The exclusionary rule was never originally justified on the basis that 
it would deter illegal police behavior; the notion of the rule as a deterrent 
'" For a study that reflects changes in police behavior from the mid 1960's to the 
1970's see, Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State and 
Federal Levels: The Case af the Exclusionary Rule, 5 AM. PoL. Q. 57 (1977). Other studies 
critici2iing the exclusionary rule are found in .Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empir-
ical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 243 (1973); 
Ban, The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Behavior (paper delivered at Midwest Political 
Science Association, May, 1973). These studies are discussed in Schlesinger, supra note 24; 
Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That it Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JuDI-
CATURE 398 (1979). 
753 For a recent dialogue between influential advocates of each side of the exclusionary 
rule debate see, Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an 'Illegal' or 'Unnatural' Interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: 
Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JuDICATURE 66 (1978); Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule 
in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More than 'An 
Empty Blessing', 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979); Wilkey, A Call for Alternatives to the Exclu-
sionary Rule: Let Congress and the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JuDICATURE 351 (1979). 
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appears first in Wolf and most prominently in Mapp. 154 But equally im-
portant to deterrence even in Mapp was the rationale that the exclusion-
ary rule promotes individual liberty and the importance of the individual 
by elevating principle above police expediency. Furthermore, the Court 
emphasized that the exclusionary rule promotes judicial integrity: that a 
judiciary which permits evidence to be used without inquiry concerning 
constitutional violations which resulted in the uncovering of that evi-
dence, debases the courts as defenders of the Constitution and makes the 
judiciary a party to the official illegality. 155 
Granting that deterrence is now one justification for retention of the 
exclusionary rule, the deterrent expectation has never been honestly ad-
dressed. A rule of evidence cannot, by itself, assure compliance with the 
principles it serves to enforce. The exclusionary rule is not self-operative. 
It can only work in those instances where the police intrusion is primarily 
for the purpose of obtaining evidence. If the intrusion is for other pur-
poses, such as harassment or to simply let a subject know that he is being 
watched by the police, evidentiary consequences of the intrusions are not 
likely to figure in the police officer's determination to search.156 
When considering the cost of the rule to the society, the exclusionary 
rule has been deemed a failure as a deterrent without ever having re-
ceived support other than from the judiciary. There has rarely been the 
continuous and intensive training in the law of search and seizure that 
police officers need to understand this aspect of their responsibilities. The 
law concerning arrests, searches and seizures is not simple. In fact, some 
aspects of it may be overly and unnecessarily complicated.157 The devel-
opment of proper judgment in police officers concerning the legality of 
their intrusions is one of the most critical aspects of the job. Developing . 
and reinforcing proper judgment in this area should be one of the pri-
mary goals of police training. While it has been conscientiously pursued 
in some cities, by and large the matter is treated by several hours of lec-
ture in basic police training courses as to what the law requires and is left 
at that. An even greater failure of leadership pertains to the inability or 
unwillingness of the law enforcement hierarchy to communicate to field 
officers an expectation that subordinates will abide by the legal limita-
tions when initiating and conducting a search. If the exclusionary rule has 
been costly, it is at least partly because the consequences suffered by po-
lice officers who violate Fourth Amendment standards have not been se-
vere. Evidence is excluded because police officers act unreasonably. It is 
not overly demanding on the part of society to require that police depart-
164 Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal 
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518. 
105 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
106 w. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1978). 
167 Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949), where the Court stated that 
probable cause is based upon "probabilities ... the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." 
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ments ensure that their line officers act in a reasonable fashion. Through-
out the history of the exclusionary rule, that message has not gotten 
through to police, in large part, because it has never been conveyed. The 
courts and the exclusionary rule have proven to be convenient targets for 
police and prosecutors on which to pin the blame for cases iost when evi-
dence is suppressed. The critics do not attach the responsibility to the 
officer who acted unreasonably or the police department that failed to 
train and lead. 158 The media has failed to link the lost cases to police 
illegality and the true targets have not been forced to respond to criti-
cism. The message that has emerged is that a certain degree of police 
illegality is acceptable to the police hierarchy and the political leadership. 
For the exclusionary rule to work, it must be reinforced within each po-
lice department at the command of a society that demands that its law 
enforcement officers obey the law while enforcing it. Overlooked in deter-
mining the costs of the exclusionary rule has been the cost of not enforc-
ing it: the ever-increasing toll of lawlessness among police who become 
used to disregarding judicial authority. Police illegality is a cost that no 
democratic society should be willing or forced to absorb. 
The argument that the exclusionary rule fails to deter illegal police 
behavior might be more palatable if it were coupled with a demand for its 
revamping rather than its abolition. 159 Clearly, the deterrent ability of the 
rule is dependent upon the erring police officer's knowledge that he or she 
••• N. MoRRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HoNEST PoLITICIAN's GuiDE To CRIME CoNTROL, 100-
101 (1969). 
••• Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), where Justice White suggested that the 
exclusionary rule should be revamped "so as to prevent its application in those many cir-
cumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the good-faith 
belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this 
belief." See also, Coe, The ALI Substantiality Test: A Flexible Approach to the Exclusion-
ary Sanction, 10 GA. L. REv. 1 (1975). Under the ALI proposal, the court must use a two 
tier approach to determine if grounds exist for excluding evidence. Initially, the court must 
determine whether the violation is substantial by comparing it to a list of factors. If any one 
is found, the violation will be classified as substantial and require mandatory exclusion. If 
none of the factors requiring mandatory exclusion are found, the court must then determine 
if the violation was nonetheless substantial by considering "all of the circumstances." 
Among the items which must be considered are: 
(a) the extent of the deviation from lawful conduct; 
(b) the extent to which the violation was willful; 
(c) the extent to which the violation was likely to have led the defendant to mis-
understand his position or his legal rights; 
(d) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of the ALI code; 
(e) whether there is a generally effective system of administrative or other sanc-
tions which makes it less important that exclusion be used to deter such a 
violation; 
(f) the extent to which the violation is likely to have influenced the defendant's 
decision to make the statement; 
(g) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the defendant's ability to sup-
port his motion, or to defend himself in the proceedings in which the statement is 
sought to be offered in evidence against him. Jd. at 5, n.10. 
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is violating the law. Restricting the rule to bad faith violations of Fourth 
Amendment strictures, viewed from an objective standard, offers more 
substance to the drive for change. Under such an approach evidence 
would not be suppressed if it is the fruit of a blunder, albeit in good faith, 
by an officer who has received sufficient training on this subject. Even 
here, though, there are legitimate arguments to counter such a proposal. 
Whether the officer acts in good or bad faith, the citizen's Fourth Amend-
ment rights have been violated. To permit the fruits of good faith viola-
tions to be used in criminal trials would, nonetheless, weaken the consti-
tutional guarantee. 160 Moreover, the problems of looking into the police 
officer's mind to ascertain good or bad faith are overwhelming. Still an-
other problem relates to the willingness of the judiciary to enforce Fourth 
Amendment rules. Trial courts have not infrequently been extremely hos-
tile to the Fourth Amendment principles that they are sworn to up-
hold.161 The good faith-bad faith dichotomy would allow such trial judges 
to weigh the balance unfairly in favor of the police officer, putting a pre-
mium on real or feigned ignorance and virtually eliminating the Fourth 
Amendment limitations. In order to ensure the application of a real ob-
jective good faith-bad faith standard, there would have to be effective 
channels for review of these decisions. Perhaps the most effective check 
upon trial court abuse of constitutional rights has been through federal 
habeas corpus, where the federal court makes an independent determina-
tion of the alleged constitutional violation. Unfortunately, the Burger 
Court in its zeal to cut back on the scope of habeas corpus review of state 
convictions, has virtually eliminated review of Fourth Amendment issues 
from the purview of habeas relief. 162 That action casts a pall upon even 
the limited desirability of the good faith-bad faith approach. 
The final argument against the exclusionary rule is that it hampers 
effective law enforcement. The silent corollary to this criticism is that 
removal of the exclusionary rule will take the handcuffs off the police and 
"'" Essentially, the problem with using a good faith-bad faith analysis is that it substi-
tutes the police officer's judgment for the constitutional rule. There would be considerable 
difficulty in actually determining the officer's state of mind at the time of his actions. Some 
officers, motivated by what to them is the overriding desire to arrest a criminal, might often 
later assert facts that would demonstrate their good faith in order to preserve the arrest 
even if they were not aware of those facts at the time of the arrest. Because of this there 
should be a hesitancy to rely on an officer's description of his state of mind in order to 
determine the constitutionality of his conduct. The approach that should be taken here is 
analogous to the manner in which probable cause is viewed. There, it is the court's view of 
the facts from an objective perspective, rather than reliance upon the officer's statement, 
that should be determinative. For an advocacy of the exclusion of all unconstitutional fruits 
of police conduct "however 'mild,' 'technical,' or 'inadvertant'" see, Kamisar, A Defense of 
the Exclusionary Rule, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 34-35 (1979). 
"" Justice Harlan wrote in his dissenting opinion in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 
244, 262-63 (1969): "Under the prevailing notion, ... the threat of habeas serves as a neces-
sary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their 
proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards." 
162 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
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enable law enforcement agencies to control crime. Again, the real nature 
of that criticism is not directed against the exclusionary rule, the remedy, 
but the rules it is intended to enforce, the limitations contained in the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. This criticism assumes that the redefinition of the parameters of 
reasonableness resulting in greater latitude for law enforcement officers is 
not sufficient. This argument demands that a free hand be offered to the 
police; and this demand needs no chamber of horrors to evoke fear. Offi-
cial excesses of authority are too recent in the American past for the 
country to bestow this authority upon the police, essentially a paramili-
tary organization whose responsiveness to civil authority varies from one 
community to another. 
There is, of course, logical inconsistency between the two argu-
ments-that the exclusionary rule should be abandoned because it has 
not been an effective deterrent of illegal police behavior, and that it 
should be abandoned because it hampers effective law enforcement. Ei-
ther the rule has hampered law enforcement and is somewhat effective as 
a deterrent of illegal police behavior or it has not served as an effective 
deterrent and thus does not diminish police efforts. The arguments can-
not stand together. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
Neither Canada nor the United States is likely to adopt the other's 
solution to illegally seized evidence, but there exists a movement for 
change in both countries. Dissatisfaction with the approach taken to this 
problem is stronger in the United States. Yet it would not be surprising if 
by the end of the 1980s both countries were to amend their laws and 
adopt limited exclusionary rules, thus moving closer to each other. 
Outright abandonment of the exclusionary rule in the United States 
would render the Fourth Amendment right to privacy meaningless be-
cause it would be totally unprotected. Existing and proposed alternative 
remedies lack the force and clout of the exclusionary rule. It is also un-
realistic to imagine abolition resulting in a new-found ability to control 
and· prevent crime. Any change predicated upon such a claim would be as 
ill-conceived as the notion, offered in the 1970s, that preventive detention 
would have a significant effect upon the crime rate. 
There is no reason to anticipate that abolition or other significant 
changes in the exclusionary rule would have as little impact upon this 
society as a history of no exclusionary rule has had upon Canada. Despite 
similarities between the two countries, there remain vast differences. Ca-
nada does not have a heritage of suspicion of authority, police abuse of 
power, and tension between the police and minorities, young people, and 
other groups. While all of that appears to be changing in Canada and 
those suspicions and tensions may be developing, they already exist in the 
United States. Indiscriminate searches of individuals and automobiles by 
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police increase tension. If abolition or curtailment of the exclusionary rule 
were envisaged as granting greater authority to the police, those tensions 
would be exacerbated, and street encounters could become more violent. 
Currently, the exclusionary rule provides a means to test the legitimacy of 
individual intrusions. More importantly, it provides the only forum in 
which standards and parameters have been drafted for this type of police 
behavior. No other forum would be as likely to make this society as con-
scious of individual rights, could as effectively formulate those rights, or 
could define the relationship between citizens and the police as well as 
the suppression hearing. In the long run, that is likely to be credited as 
the greatest contribution of the exclusionary rule. 
There is no corresponding awareness of individual rights in Canada. 
There has been, at least until fairly recently, a general insensitivity to 
police misconduct in conducting searches. Absent an exclusionary rule, 
judges in criminal cases are uninterested in how the police discover evi-
dence. Thus, the issue of where police powers end and individual rights 
take precedence is not high in the consciousness of the legal community. 
Neither is it so in the press, nor among the general public. The existing 
Canadian alternatives to the exclusionary rule have not had the effect of 
making the police and public more sensitive to individual rights. Instead, 
the existence of illusory remedies has contributed to the sanguinity about 
privacy and the lack of controls that exist on the police. 
The absence of citizen concern about their rights and the lack of an 
effective remedy tend to embolden law enforcement officers. I talked with 
no police officer in Canada who was the least bit concerned about civil 
suits or internal discipline arising out of search and seizure incidents. 
Even absent the pressure of citizens demanding their rights in confronta-
tions with police, there is evidence that Canadian police are beginning to 
develop the self-image that seems to prevail among their American coun-
terparts: that they represent the embattled thin barrier between anarchy 
and civilization. 163 As that attitude grows, a countervailing call for 
greater, more effective controls upon the police may develop across 
Canada. 
163 MACLEANS (Oct. 2, 1976); 66 CANADIAN PoLICE CHIEF, (No. 1) .Jan. 1977 at 7. 
